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Abstract. Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is the most widely used system analysis 
tool for investigating safety related incidents in healthcare. This contribution 
reviews RCA techniques, using a Health Informatics example, and discusses 
barriers to their successful uptake by healthcare organisations. It is concluded that 
a critical assessment to examine the uptake and evaluate the success of RCA, and 
other safety related techniques, within healthcare is long overdue. 
Keywords. Root Cause Analysis, NHS, 5-Why’s, Cause and Effect Diagram. 
1. Introduction 
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is, by far, the most widely used system analysis tool for 
investigating healthcare safety related incidents either as a stand-alone technique or as 
part of a continuous improvement methodology such as Lean Sigma [1]. A systems-
based approach RCA is, ideally, a team-based exercise that seeks to identify why 
adverse incidents happen by determining the underlying cause(s) of the problem, while 
avoiding focusing on mistakes by individuals. 
 RCA has been used in healthcare since the mid 1990’s and is currently prevalent 
in the US, UK and Australia while in the process of being adopted in many other 
countries [2]. In the US its use has been mandated by the Joint Commission (since 
1997) for the analysis of sentinel events while in the UK the National Health Service 
(NHS) has endorsed RCA as the main tool for incident investigation since 2001, 
including the development of a RCA toolkit for healthcare [3].  The RCA process is 
sequential in nature comprising the following main steps: (1) identify the incident, (2) 
organise a team to carry out the RCA, (3) study the work processes, (4) collect the 
facts, (5) search for causes; (6) take action, (7) evaluate the actions taken [4]. 
Successful IT organizations are increasingly implementing RCA for problem solving 
purposes with it being recognized, within healthcare, that RCA plays a major role in 
helping to understand cognitive factors related to Health Informatics (HI)-related 
adverse events, for example, adverse events related to the introduction and use of 
Electronic Health Records (EHR) [5] in the clinical environment. 
An overview of the RCA techniques recommended by NHS England is provided 
with the ‘5-Why’s’ approach being applied to an EHR related example. Pros and cons 
of the RCA approach are briefly outlined with some challenges relating to the 
successful uptake and use of RCA, and safety analysis techniques in general, by NHS 
hospitals are then discussed.  
2.0 RCA Approaches: 5 Why’s and Cause and Effect Diagrams 
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The Institute for Safe Medication Practices states that for the RCA to be effective, an 
accurate sequence of events and timeline are needed to understand the relationship 
between contributory factors and the underlying cause [6].  After the  determination of 
an accurate sequence of events NHS England supports the use of the ‘5 why’s’ method 
for root cause determination, a Cause and Effect diagram for graphically illustrating the 
possible multiple causes that contribute to a specified problem and a Pareto chart to 
identify the most effective RCA actions to be carried out [7].  
 
2.1 The 5-Why’s and Cause and Effect Diagrams 
 
The ‘5 Why’s’ method of root cause determination involves repeatedly questioning 
‘why’ to an initial problem statement (more specifically, questioning the answer to 
each specific ‘why’) so that the reasons the problem exists are critically explored. If 
used properly, the ‘5-Why’s’ traces the 'chain of causality' back to the root cause. It 
may take fewer or more than five Why’s before the team agrees that the root cause of 
the problem has been revealed. Figure 1 shows a simple example where the root cause 
is related to software upgrades of the EHR. 
Define the Problem: Intravenous medication received by patient longer than necessary. 
  Why is it happening?  
1. Nurse did not see STOP notice on top of EHR screen      Why is that? 
    
2. STOP notice moved to bottom of screen      Why is that? 
  
3. Software upgrade changed EHR screen format      Why is that? 
    
4. Vendor didn’t check implications of upgrade on EHR 
screen presentation. 
     Why Is that? 
 
.  
 
Figure 1.  5 Why’s example related to intravenous medication received longer than necessary [10]. 
In this example, Figure 1, the nursing staff expected to see a STOP notice at 
the top of the EHR screen. The position of the STOP notice changed with the software 
upgrade. The root cause of this problem was a lack of consultation, about the new EHR 
upgrade, between the vendor and the hospital. 
Nicolini et al., [8] documented 10 incident investigations, within two large 
acute NHS hospitals, over an 18 month period to gain a deeper insight into how RCA 
was being used within the NHS. The ‘timeline’ was seen to be systematically used (in 
conjunction with ‘brainstorming’) to determine root causes, while Cause and Effect 
diagrams were seen in only two of the investigations and the ‘5-Why’s’ approach was 
not seen at all. Similarly Antony and Kumar [1] examined the use of the Lean Sigma 
methodology (within NHS Scotland), and the safety techniques therein, to find that 
RCA was used but no one used Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) which is 
supposedly healthcare’s main hazard and risk analysis tool. Lack of, or poor, training 
was a common staff complaint with Antony and Kumar concluding that ‘In the NHS, it 
appears that there is clear lack of leadership and strategic vision with regard to 
continuous business improvement methodologies’ [1]. A contributing factor, to the lack 
of uptake of systematic safety analysis methods, could be mismatch between current 
5.  Lack of consultation relating to new upgrades       Why Is that? 
safety analysis techniques and the healthcare domain. Work is being carried out on 
developing less time consuming, more transparent healthcare orientated analysis 
approaches [9] though it has also been suggested that tools that ‘reflect the narrative 
nature of thinking amongst healthcare practitioners’ [8] be developed, and used 
alongside traditional engineering-based analysis tools. 
A series of RCA’s relating to a specific outcome such as, for example, 
‘Unintended Consequences relating to the use of EHR’s’, should for transparency sake 
be presented graphically via a ‘Cause and Effect’ diagram, see Figure 2. From the ‘5 
Why’s’ example, the determined root cause ‘lack of consultation relating to new 
upgrades’ would comprise a primary cause within the EHR (as designed) 
Infrastructure. 
 
Figure 2. A Cause and Effect diagram for unintended consequences of EHR’s [10]. 
2. Pros and Cons of ‘5-Why’s’ and RCA 
The attraction of the ‘5-Whys’ approach to RCA lies in its simplicity and transparency, 
especially when problems involve human factors or interactions, which makes it 
particularly relevant for the safe use of EHR’s. Healthcare practitioners need to be 
made aware of its advantages over ‘brainstorming’. ‘5-Why’s’ can also help determine 
the relationship between other root causes. The ‘5 Whys’ method has a number of 
recognized limitations [11]:  
 Its application to large-scale issues is limited. 
 The results are dependent on user/team knowledge – causes cannot be found 
that are not already known. This is why a team approach is needed. 
 There is a tendency to stop prematurely at symptoms rather than going on to 
lower-level root causes.  
 Results are not repeatable – different teams using ‘5 Whys’ will come up with 
different causes for the same problem. 
Borrowing from Fault Tree construction rules, logical tests for necessity and 
sufficiency could be used at each level to help avoid the selection of spurious causes as 
well as also promoting the consideration of multiple root causes. 
4.0 Discussion: How Effective is RCA? 
RCA, within healthcare, should deliver improvement through promoting workforce 
involvement, fostering horizontal workplace relationships, liberalising the scrutiny of 
clinical expertise, and creating a democratised view of service transformation [4].  
Nicolini et al., [7] indicate that apart from ‘promoting workforce involvement’ the 
workplace hierarchy still persists within RCA team meetings coupled with a general 
lack of enthusiasm from clinician’s regarding attendance.  Though the clinician’s 
attendance might be partly attributed to time constraints the persistence of a blame 
culture within the NHS continues to play a major role [12].  
Though RCA is widely used, using ‘Brainstorming’ rather the ‘5 Why’s’approach, 
there is little evidence to support its effectiveness from both an efficacy and cost 
perspective [2].  This is surprising given NHS England’s continuing mission to 
‘optimise flow and reduce costs’. There seems to be no consensus on how NHS 
hospitals should follow up or analyze RCA data, which limits the utility of RCA as a 
quality improvement tool [7]. The US Veteran Affairs RCA toolkit explicitly includes 
steps to determine the ‘approximate cost of the RCA’ as well as ‘reporting on the 
effectiveness of RCA actions’ [4] with one rigorous US study, indicating that RCA 
developed actions reduced error rates related to preventable serious adverse drug events 
(ADEs) - reported serious ADEs/100,000 patient days decreased from 7.2 to 4.0 [13]. 
 RCA is the most widespread safety analysis technique used in the NHS though 
root cause determination seems to be solely based on brainstorming with the 
recommended more systematic ‘5-Why’s’ approach not being used [7]. A critical 
assessment of the effectiveness of RCA, and also other safety related techniques such 
as FMEA, within the NHS, is overdue. 
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